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Abstract
The epistemological situation of a single cell is considered.
In chemotaxis, the relation between perception and action is
found to be lawful and bidirectional. Consideration of the
perception/action relation allows a characterization of the phe-
nomenal world of the cell. This phenomenal world is grounded
in perceptual distinctions that are relevant to the sustained vi-
ability of the cell. Moving up the phylogenetic chain, this
lawfulness, and its relation to the phenomenal world of ex-
perience, is found to be essentially unchanged in multicellular
organisms. Nervous systems add some innovation, in allow-
ing distal responses and the non-linear combination of infor-
mation, but from cell to human, the differentiation of the phe-
nomenal world is found to arise from the lawfulness of the
perception/action relation, which in turn reflects the biologi-
cal constitution of the organism, and not a pre-given objec-
tive world. This recognition suggests that rather than looking
within the nervous system for representations of pre-given, ex-
ternal, entities, one might do better to explore the fit between
the function of the nervous system and the phenomenal, mean-
ingful, world encountered by the organism in experience. Key-
words: representation; epistemology; ecological psychology;
enaction; phenomenology; neutral monism;
Introduction
The utility of the notion of representation in nervous systems
has been much debated, and its central explanatory role in
accounting for interaction between an organism and its envi-
ronment is under considerable attack from many quarters. To
some, representations are firmly established explanatory con-
structs, as, e.g. in the preservation of retinotopic mapping
in the visual system through several successive processing
steps) (Tusa, Palmer, & Rosenquist, 1978), or in rather more
abstract form, as evidenced by mental rotation tasks (Shepard
& Cooper, 1986). To others, the very notion of representa-
tions constitutes a homuncular mistake (Dreyfus, 2002). This
essay will concern itself primarily with representation as it is
evoked to explain the potential for perception and action in an
environment. It will not address higher order representations,
assumed to underlie intellectual activity such as chess playing
or the use of propositional language.
A humming bird’s beak is exquisitely matched to the shape
of the trumpet of a specific flower (Figure 1). The flower’s
shape, in turn, is a perfect fit to the bird’s beak. Both are
the product of a long process of co-evolution. Nobody would
be tempted to describe this state of affairs by saying that the
beak represents the flower, or vice versa. A long history of co-
evolution has produced a matching pair in beak and trumpet.
This state of affairs seems to parallel the relationship between
nervous system activity and the phenomenal world very well.
I wish to take this (perhaps perplexing) analogy seriously.
To do so, it is useful to consider the phylogenesis of per-
ception/action systems, and to extend our view back to the
epistemological situation of a single cell. This example has
Figure 1: The hummingbird’s beak and the flower share a
long history of co-evolution.
been given detailed consideration recently by several theo-
rists from both phenomenological (Thompson, 2007) and bio-
centric traditions (Lyon & Keijzer, 2007; Van Duijn, Keijzer,
& Franken, 2006), and hearkens back to the account of the
continuity of cognition and life put forward within the enac-
tive tradition (Maturana & Varela, 1987). Even the simplest
prokaryotic cells exhibit complex behavior individually, and,
especially, collectively. What follows is thus a cartoon-ishly
simplified sketch whose purpose is to illustrate the epistemo-
logical basis for a phenomenal world. By phenomenal world
is meant the totality of immediate experience for an individ-
ual.
An attempt to describe in human language what the phe-
nomenal world of a cell is like may seem like pure folly
(Nagel, 1974). However, without claiming to have an experi-
ence similar to that of the cell, we may consider the structure
of the encounter between a cell and its environment, noting
what information is available to the cell, and what it is infor-
mation about. In this way we can attempt to uncover the ba-
sis for encountering a world, and thus having an experience,
as long as we restrict our analysis to a suitably pared-down
case. Therein, it is to be hoped, lies the utility of a cellular
example. A more ambitious example is found in Jakob von
Uexku¨ell’s spirited attempt to describe (and draw!) the phe-
nomenal worlds of a variety of animals, from paramecium to
dog (Uexku¨ll, 1989), in which he considers the set of percep-
tual distinctions potentially available to the individual based
on their capacity to make discriminations and to act in their
environment1.
1von Uexku¨ll retains a clear distinction between the perceiving
Perception/action and the epistemological
predicament of a single cell
For a lone cell in a medium, movement is based on chemo-
taxis, which is the process by which a cell appears to swim up
a nutrient gradient or away from a source of toxins (Figure 2).
Through cellular movement (described in detail in van Duijn
et al., 2006), a chemical concentration gradient is available at
the membrane of the cell. The movement of the cell stands
in lawful relation to this gradient. If one assumes some agen-
tive nature to the cell, this looks like perceptually guided ac-
tion, but that conventional interpretation assumes a causal di-
rection (perception resulting in action) that the situation does
not warrant. Movement of the cell makes the gradient man-
ifest (and so action gives rise to perception), while the gra-
dient itself can account for the form of movement (whereby
perception gives rise to action). In this situation, perception
and action are inseparable, and collectively instantiate a sin-
gle functional relation between organism and environment.
For this simple example, the relation is very direct and is me-
diated only by the biochemical processes within the cell that
extend from receptors on the membrane to activation of the
flagellae that propel the cell.
Figure 2: In chemotaxis, an E. Coli cell alternates between
periods of undirected tumbling, and coordinated swimming
in a single direction. The likelihood of changing from co-
ordinated movement to uncoordinated tumbling is inversely
proportional to the concentration of nutrient sensed, pro-
ducing, on average, movement towards the nutrient source.
(Van Duijn et al., 2006)
What world does such a cell encounter? For our present
purposes, we can exhaustively describe the phenomenal
world of this simple (and simplified) cell, and that descrip-
tion can be couched in terms of perception or action. It is
important, then, to bear in mind that these are simply differ-
ent facets of the same functional relationship.
subject and the environment perceived around them. The present
account goes further in insisting on a unity of subject and object in
immediate experience.
If we consider perception, or those features of the world
that are distinguishable for the cell, we find a single distinc-
tion, and it is a spatial one. The gradient expressed at the
membrane makes one and only one distinction possible: it
distinguishes this direction from that direction, where ‘this’ is
the direction in which more nutrient lies. Or one might adopt
a less discrete view of the space inhabited by the cell, and say
instead that the gradient gives rise to a simple non-uniform
distribution in three-dimensional space. What is central to ei-
ther descriptive convention is that an undifferentiated spatial
environment becomes meaningfully differentiated by virtue
of the gradient encountered. A similar consideration of the
potential for action of the cell again highlights a simple dif-
ferentiation. Instead of movement being equally likely in all
directions, action is now directed towards the nutrient source
(or away from toxins). The space of potential action is thus
shaped by the gradient.
The cell thus encounters a differentiated world. Admit-
tedly, its structure is minimal, because this is a deliberately
pared down example. Nevertheless, as external observers, we
can make the following observation: The single distinction
the cell is capable of making is a distinction firmly rooted in
the cell’s own constitution. A chemical gradient, considered
in the absence of a sensing organism, has no special ontolog-
ical status, and is not information bearing. To the cell, how-
ever, the gradient is the basis by which the world resolves
from homogeneity into a differentiated space. We can readily
imagine the presence of several other chemical or energetic
gradients at the environment/cell border to which the cell is
entirely indifferent. Because they bear no significance to the
sustained identity of the cell, they form no part of the phe-
nomenal world of the cell, just as the many television broad-
cast signals that permeate the space around you form no part
of your phenomenal world. The world the cell encounters is
drawn in terms of the cell’s own constitution. (If sensitivity
should arise to some aspect of the environment that is irrele-
vant to the maintenance of the identity of the organism, there
will be no reason for this sensitivity to be preserved or honed
in subsequent evolutionary change.)
The perception/action relation in more complex
beings
The example of a single cell is informative precisely because
we can retain oversight over all aspects of the phenomenal
world that arises, or is brought forth (to use the parlance of
Maturana and Varela, 1987), for the cell. As we consider
more complex organisms, multi-cellular organisms, organ-
isms with nervous systems, and ultimately, humans, the fun-
damental characteristics of the epistemological situation do
not change in principle.
The box jellyfish larva has what has been described as the
simplest visual system in the animal kingdom (Nordstro¨m,
Walle´n, Seymour, & Nilsson, 2003). The entire animal has
only 5 differentiated cell types, three of which are found in
the membrane (Figure 3). Most membrane cells have sin-
gle ciliae which vibrate in uncontrolled fashion, producing an
undirected force. A second type of membrane cell is photo-
sensitive, and the action of the light within the cell causes
their ciliae to adopt a specific angle with respect to the light
gradient. (The third type is irrelevant in the present context.)
Collectively, these photo-sensitive cells with their ciliae act
as a distributed rudder, steering the otherwise uncontrolled
motion of the larva with respect to the light gradient. Again,
perception and action are directly, inextricably, and recipro-
cally, linked. They constitute a single functional relation, and
they serve to exploit lawful properties of the environment that
are matched to the constitution of the organism.
Figure 3: Left: Most epithelial cells have cilia which move
randomly. Interspersed between these are ocelli which are
equipped with photoreceptors. Right: An ocellus combines
photoreceptive microvilli that act directly to orient the mov-
able cilium, thus creating a distributed rudder. Each ocellus
acts as an independent sensory-motor unit. (After Nordstro¨m
et al., 2003)
With the introduction of nervous systems, nothing funda-
mental changes. The presence of a nervous system allows an
organism to do two things that those without nervous systems
can not. Firstly, information expressed as a physical, chem-
ical or energetic gradient at the membrane can now elicit a
rapid distal response in the organism. This is a very substan-
tial innovation, allowing larger, more responsive organisms
that are capable of much more nuanced and varied interaction
with their environments. A stimulus manifested at one point
on the border may produce a response in an entirely different
location.
The second major innovation that arises with a nervous
system is that information from two or more locations on
the membrane can be combined, allowing highly non-linear
response characteristics to continuous gradient differentials,
and vice versa. Again, this vastly increases the degree of me-
diation, or indirectness in the perception/action relation. For
the external observer, it becomes much harder to uncover the
lawfulness of the relation, but there is no reason to think that
the relation suddenly changes its lawful character. Indeed,
even in humans, we can sometimes see this very direct rela-
tion, as for example in the strong link between postural sway
and the optic flow occasioned by a moving environment such
as a swaying room (Lishman & Lee, 1973).
Despite the richness that arises in the perception/action re-
lationship with the introduction of a nervous system, the fun-
damental insight that the action of the organism stands in law-
ful relation to the physical/chemical/energetic gradient ex-
pressed at the sensory border with the environment persists.
This is as true of the simplest animals with nervous systems,
such as the hydra, as it is of humans. In as much as the phe-
nomenal world of the organism arises from its embedding
as a perceiving/acting system within a rich environment, the
world encountered by either hydra or human is drawn in basic
strokes derived from the perception/action relation. The kind
of distinctions possible to such an organism are those that
are now, or (phylogenetically) were once of some functional
significance to the maintenance of its identity as an individ-
ual organism. Although the phenomenal world arises now,
based on the perception/action system of a single organism,
its structure is a function of the phylogenetic lineage of that
individual, considered as an extended unity. The world en-
countered in experience is thus drawn in strokes grounded in
the constitution and needs of a living being with its evolution-
ary history, and is in no sense pre-given.
Nervous systems, as we have seen, allow considerable me-
diation between information gradients and movement. One
result of this is that the organism appears to possess a great
degree of autonomy in its motion through an increasingly
complex environment. Our received notions of agency and
free will may lead us to ignore the lawfulness that underlies
the perception/action relation. While this lawfulness may be
apparent in the minimalist case of the single cell, it is largely
obscured in animals with complex nervous systems and so-
phisticated behavioural repertoires. Indeed, a full reconcil-
iation of our accounts of agency with our increasing appre-
ciation of the lawfulness that characterizes the operation of
biological systems is still outstanding (Wegner, 2003). How-
ever this apparent autonomy does not invalidate the obser-
vation that all distinctions made by the organism in perceiv-
ing/acting are predicated upon the physico-chemico-energetic
flux at the border between organism and environment. This
is as true for humans as cells. The information required for a
human to apprehend a distant object is expressed in the struc-
ture of the optic flow on the retina. Vision, touch, audition,
all function through structured energetic distributions at the
boundary between biological organism and environment. In
recognition of this, it has been suggested that touch, rather
than vision, ought to provide us with our conceptual paradigm
for perception, as it forces us to recognize that structured en-
ergy distributions at the surface are the means by which we
perceive anything (Noe, 2006). We tend to be less aware of
this when thinking about vision, both because of the seduc-
tiveness of the false analogy between the eyes and optical in-
struments with lenses or windows, and because the structured
distributions for vision are hidden, at the back of the eyeball.
Those distinctions that perception/action systems retain
through phylogenesis must be presumed to be those that con-
tribute to the continued viability of the organism’s lineage.
Given the phylogenetic distance between a human and a sin-
gle cell, many of the distinctions we are capable of making,
and that thus serve to differentiate the world as experienced,
are presumably interpretable only with reference to distant
ancestors and their associated environments. Evolution dif-
ferentiates, modifies, and refines, but it does not do spring
cleaning. It is therefore not surprising that the worlds we
encounter in immediate experience appear entirely distinct
from us - so much so that we conventionally describe an inner
(mental) and an outer (physical) realm as if they were entirely
distinct. Yet considered thus, it is apparant that the phenom-
enal world, the world revealed in immediate experience, is
in no sense distinct from the perceiving/acting organism, but
is, rather, a function of the organism (together with its entire
phylogenetic lineage) and its embedding within a continually
evolving environment.
We now consider a more complex account of human ner-
vous system function that is usually described as represen-
tational. Work in human motor control has convincingly
demonstrated that skillful action is based, in part, upon the
ability of the central nervous system to predict events prob-
abilistically (Ko¨rding & Wolpert, 2004). The probabilistic
models that best account for variability in action have been
found to be nearly optimal in a Bayesian sense. That is, the
action is optimized with respect to the prior probabilities of
event distributions in the environment. This is conventionally
described as the representation of a probabilistic model of the
environment that is computed by the brain. It can, however,
equally be seen as an optimal fit between the neural dynamics
of the brain and the characteristics of the environment rele-
vant to the action of the organism. Viewed in this light, even
the complex, seemingly autonomous, action of a higher mam-
malian organism illustrates the optimal fit between its consti-
tution and those informational aspect of the environment that
are relevant to its functioning.
Discussion
The argument here suggests a somewhat unorthodox account
of what it is that nervous systems do. Nervous systems medi-
ate the perception/action relation, thereby giving rise to phe-
nomenal worlds. This claim hardly suffices to account for
much of the presumed role of nervous systems in higher or-
der cognition, nor is it so intended. Instead, it points to the
essential unity between the subject and the world encountered
by the subject in immediate experience. In this vein, it is in
keeping with a central claim of neutral monism (James, 1904)
that in immediate experience, there is no distinction between
the experiencer and the experience, or between the object and
the perception of the object. William James (1904) observed:
The instant field of the present is at all times what I call
the ’pure’ experience. It is only virtually or potentially
either object or subject as yet. For the time being, it is
plain, unqualified actuality, or existence, a simple that.
(James 1904, p. 23)
James, of course, maintained a clear distinction between
the field of pure experience and the derived world of con-
cepts. (A similar distinction is well preserved in many inter-
pretations of Buddhist thought, though that would lead us too
far afield here.)
Whereas many received accounts of perception start with
a nervous system which is distinct from the world being rep-
resented, this analysis suggests instead that there has been
a long evolutionary process of co-development between the
perception/action capabilities of an organism and the world
experienced by that organism. The fundamental separation
suggested by a representational account is replaced by a rela-
tionship of co-determination between organism and phenom-
enal world.
This account of the deeply intertwined nature of the rela-
tionship between the organism and the environment suggests
a retelling of an old story: that of the affordance principle un-
derlying the discipline of ecological psychology (Heft, 2003).
According to the present account of the phylogenesis of per-
ception/action systems, all distinctions an organism is capa-
ble of making in an environment are those that are, or have
been in its phylogenetic past, of utility in guiding action in the
service of maintaining the structure and viability of the organ-
ism. Affordances, by this account, are not additional proper-
ties some things in an environment have, such as the graspa-
bility of a door handle or the climbability of a set of steps.
The affordance principle goes much deeper. The entire phe-
nomenal world that arises through the action of nervous sys-
tems completely embedded in complex bodies, immersed in
information rich environments, arises because some aspects
of the environment offer action possibilities to the organism.
Every ‘thing’ we encounter, every distinction we can make in
our phenomenal world, arises from the lawful exploitation of
some aspect of the environment that affords action, now or
in the phylogenetic past. This, I believe, is what the enactive
approach talks about when the phrase ‘bringing forth a phe-
nomenal world”’ is employed (Maturana and Varela, 1987).
The notion of representation, then, that has guided so much
theorizing within cognitive science, appears now as a focus
on one half of an inseparable pair. Whereas ecological psy-
chology, by and large, has focused on the structure of the in-
formation gradient expressed at the sensory surface, cognitive
psychology, with its focus upon representation, has looked
almost exclusively inwards, at the nervous system. A con-
ventional psychophysics experiment done in a carefully con-
trolled environment then appears in a slightly new light. It is
just as if we were to attempt to study the beak of the hum-
ming bird through experiments in which the bird feeds from
a flat, rigorously controllable, plastic bird feeder instead of
from the trumpet of its natural match, the flower. It is not
that one would learn nothing about the beak from this exer-
cise, but that many important aspects thereof would surely be
missed. This will come as no news to ethologists.
Figure 4: The beak and the feeder share no common history.
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